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WYETH v. LEVINE: AN UNEXPECTED OUTCOME FOR 
"THE BUSINESS CASE OF THE CENTURY." 
by 
J.L. Yranski Nasuti, JD, LLM* 
There was much anticipation in the business world as the 
U.S. Supreme Court prepared to announce its decision in the 
case of Wyeth v. Levine.' During the previous year, the court 
had ruled that, in most instances, state product liability claims 
could not be filed against manufacturers of medical devices 
that had been approved by the Federal Drug Administration 
(FDA).2 The hope was that the pro-business justices would 
extend this immunity to pharmaceutical companies who 
marketed FDA approved drugs. The Chamber of Commerce, 
which underwrote a multimillion dollar lobbying campaign to 
push for federal preemption as a protection against state court 
actions, referred to Wyeth as the "business case of the 
century."3 Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan, of Stamford 
University, noted that "corporate America has discovered that 
they would much rather be regulated by one government in 
Washington than by 50 state governments, or by the most 
aggressive ofthem."4 It was, therefore, quite a disappointment 
to Wall Street when the court ruled that federal law did not 
preempt state law actions against manufacturers of FDA 
approved drugs. 
*Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Iona College, New 
Rochelle, NY 
201 0/Wyeth v. Levine/2 
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
The Food and Drugs Act of 19065 was the first important 
federal legislation in the area of public health regulation to 
supplement the protection provided through state regulation 
and common-law liability by prohibiting the manufacture or 
interstate shipment of adulterated or misbranded drugs and by 
providing for the creation of the FDA to regulate the food and 
drug industries. Thirty-two years later, Congress passed the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)6 in response to 
growing concerns about the continued distribution of unsafe 
drugs and the use of fraudulent marketing. Under the FDCA, 
a manufacturer could not engage in the interstate marketing of 
a new drug until the FDA had determined that it was "safe for 
use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the proposed labeling thereof'.7 The FDCA's 
premarket approval process required the manufacturer to 
submit a "New Drug Application" (NDA) to the FDA for each 
new drug it sought to market. If the FDA rejected a 
manufacturer's application because the drug was deemed to be 
unsafe for use as labeled, the manufacturer was prohibited from 
selling that product. If, on the other hand, the FDA approved 
the application or failed to act within 60 days after the 
application was filed, the new drug was eligible for sale.8 
The FDCA were altered with the passage of the Drug 
Amendments of 1962 (the 1962 amendments).9 One 
particularly significant change resulted in the shifting of the 
burden of proof so that the FDA no longer had to show that a 
drug would cause harm. The manufacturer now had the burden 
of establishing that its drug was both "safe and effective" and 
that its labeling was not "false and misleading." That meant 
that the sponsor had to demonstrate that the drug was "safe for 
the use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the proposed labeling"10 and that there was 
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"substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it 
purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use 
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed 
labeling." 11 
While the Drug Amendments of 1962 increased the powers 
of the FDA, they also contained a savings clause that 
specifically addressed the issue of the federal preemption of 
state law claims. That provision stated that: 
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to 
the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall 
be construed as invalidating any provision of 
State law which would be valid in the absence 
of such amendments unless there is a direct and 
positive conflict between such amendments and 
such provisions of State law. 12 
Prior to 197 6, 13 the states had the primary responsibility for 
regulating new medical devices. The passage of the Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) not only authorized the 
FDA to regulate medical devices, as well as drugs, it also 
contained a federal preemption provision that expressly 
prohibited states and their political subdivisions from 
establishing, or continuing to give effect to, requirements 
relating to medical devices intended for human use that were 
either different from the requirements established under the 
MDA or which related to the safety or effectiveness of the 
device.14 
While Congress had never enacted a preemption provision 
(similar to the one contained in the MDA) for prescription 
drugs, the FDA attempted to rectify that omission when it 
inserted a substantive preemption statement into the preamble 
of a seemingly benign regulation concerning "Requirements on 
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Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug 
and Biological Products, Supplementary Information (the 2006 
Regulation)." 15 The wording of the preamble, which 
preempted state tort claims involving FDA approved drugs, 
reflected an on-going policy of the Bush administration to 
insert preemption language into regulations relating to a variety 
of federally regulated products- including cars, mattresses, 
motorcycle brakes, and railroad cars. 16 The preamble 
specifically stated that: 
[The] FDA believes that State laws conflict with 
and stand as an obstacle to achievement of the 
full objectives and purposes of Federal law 
when a statement that FDA has considered and 
found scientifically unsubstantiated . . . [or 
when State law] purports to preclude a firm 
from including in labeling or advertising a 
statement that is included in prescription drug 
labeling. 17 
Congress overhauled the FDCA and attempted to strengthen 
the resources available to the FDA when it enacted the FDCA 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 
(FDAAA). 18 Under the new amendments, the FDA was 
authorized, under certain circumstances, to compel label 
changes in the event that negotiations with the manufacturers 
have been unsuccessful, 19 to require manufacturers to 
undertake additional safety studies even after a drug has 
received FDA approval,20 and to require a manufacturer to 
change its drug label based on safety information that becomes 
available after the FDA has initially granted approval.2 1 The 
FDAAA did not, however, include or endorse the preemption 
language contained in the preamble of the 2006 regulation. 
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II. THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS 
A. The Drug Application Process 
The FDA's review of a New Drug Application (NDA) 
focuses on whether the drug is safe and effective for its 
intended use. Among the items included in the NDA are "the 
labeling proposed to be used for such drug"22 (with "adequate 
directions for use" as well as "adequate warnings" against 
unsafe use and methods of administration),23 "full reports of 
investigations which have been made to show whether or not 
such drug [was] safe for use and whether such drug [was] ... 
effective in use,24 and "a discussion of why the benefits exceed 
the risks [of the drug] under the conditions stated in the 
labeling."25 
The wording of the label is of particular concern to the FDA 
since is a primary source of information for clinicians in 
making prescription decisions. A label typically includes a 
description of the drug's intended uses as well as its potential 
risks, contraindications, warnings, precautions and adverse 
reactions.26 In the course of reviewing a NDA, the FDA and 
the manufacturer discuss, in detail, the wording of any 
proposed warnings. If the FDA approves an NDA, the 
manufacturer must market the drug with the specific final 
version of the drug's label. 27 
As a general rule, a manufacturer may not alter an FDA 
approved warning label unless the FDA approves the 
manufacturer's Supplemental NDA.28 That having been said, 
the FDA's "Changes Being Effected" regulation (CBE 
regulation/9 does allow a manufacturer to make some changes 
to a label after a supplemental application has been filed but 
prior to its approval by the FDA. The CBE regulation applies 
in those instances in which the manufacturer seeks to "add or 
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strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse 
reaction" or to "add or strengthen an instruction about dosage 
and administration that is intended to increase the safe use of 
the drug product. "30 
B. The FDA Approval Process for Phenergan 
Promthazine hydrochloride is an antihistamine, which was 
developed by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, to treat nausea. The 
FDA originally approved Wyeth's NDA for the drug in 1955. 
Since then, Wyeth has sold the injectable drug under the brand 
name of Phenergan. Phenergan can be injected either 
intramuscularly or intravenously. An intravenous injection can 
be done by an "IV-push" method or an "IV-drip" method. The 
" IV -push" method allows the clinician to inject the drug 
directly into the patient's vein. The "IV-drip" method, on the 
other hand, requires the clinician to place the drug into a stream 
of saline solution flowing from a hanging intravenous bag. 
The solution then slowly drips through a catheter that has been 
inserted into the patient's arm. 
After receiving its initial approval to market the drug, 
Wyeth continued to communicate with the FDA concerning 
issues relating to the text of the warning label for Phenegran. 
In 1973, 1975, and 1981, the company submitted three 
supplemental NDAs for the drug. The first two were approved 
after the FDA proposed a number of labeling changes. A third 
was submitted in 1981 in response to a new FDA drug labeling 
rule. Between 1981 and 2004, Wyeth and the FDA continued 
to communicate intermittently concerning the wording of the 
warning label. In 1987, the FDA suggested that the label be 
changed to address the risk of arterial exposure. Although the 
federal agency received a revised label31 from Wyeth in 1988, 
it never responded to Wyeth's submission- and Wyeth 
continued to use the previously approved label. In fact, Wyeth 
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did not hear from the FDA again about the warning label until 
1996- when the FDA asked to see a copy of the then in-use 
label for Phenergan. After Wyeth complied with that request, 
it was instructed by the FDA "to [r]etain verbiage in current 
label"32 as it related to intra-arterial injection and to make a 
few other related to intra-arterial injections. In 
1998, the FDA finally approved Wyeth's 1981 application with 
the provision that the final printed label "must be identical" to 
the approved package insert?3 
III. LEVINE V WYETH-A STATE COURT ACTION 
A. Background 
Diana Levine, a professional musician who had played the 
electric bass guitar for bands such as the Re-Bops and Duke 
and the Detours, suffered from debilitating migraine 
headaches. On April 7, 2000, Levine . went to the Northeast 
Washington County Community Health, Inc., a local health 
clinic in Vermont, and asked to be treated for a migraine and 
nausea. She was given Demerol for the pain and an 
intramuscular injection of Phenergan for the nausea. Later in 
the day, she returned to the clinic complaining of "intractable" 
migraines, "terrible pain," inability to "bear light or sound," 
sleeplessness, hours-long spasms of "retching" and "vomiting," 
and the failure of "every possible" alternative treatment.34 
Jessica Fisch, the physician's assistant, responded by 
administering a second dose of time through a 
direct intravenous injection into Levine ' s arm by means of an 
"IV push" procedure. Phenergan, a corrosive drug that is 
meant for infusion into a person's vein, can cause irreversible 
gangrene if it inserted into a patient's artery. Unfortunately 
the Phenergan given to Levine entered her artery (either 
because Fisch inserted the needle directly into the artery or 
because the drug was injected into a vein and then escaped into 
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surrounding tissue35 where it came into contact with arterial 
blood.) In the following weeks, Levine developed 
the tissue in her right forearm died, she experienced extreme 
pain, and her fingers slowly started to tum black. The doctors 
tried to stop the spread of the gangrene by amputating her right 
hand. When that did not work, they eventually had to amputate 
her entire forearm. 
B. Vermont Superior Court 
Levine originally sued the health center and the physician's 
assistant for her pain and suffering, substantial medical 
expenses, and the loss of her livelihood as a professional 
musician. Both lawsuits were settled out of court. Levine then 
filed a complaint against Wyeth Pharmaceutical, the 
manufacturer of Phenergan, in the Vermont Superior Court, 
based on state common-law actions of negligence and failure-
to-warn product liability. 36 The complaint alleged that the 
label on the Phenergan product was defective, not because it 
failed to warn of the danger of gangrene and amputation 
following an inadvertent intra-arterial injection, but, because it 
failed to instruct clinicians to use the IV-drip method of 
intravenous infusion rather than the more dangerous IV -push 
method. 37 According to Levine, "Phenergan is not reasonably 
safe for intravenous administration because the foreseeable 
risks of gangrene and loss of limb are great in relation to the 
drug's therapeutic benefits. "38 
Wyeth filed a motion for summary judgment based on the 
argument that the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claims were 
preempted by federal law. The trial court rejected both the 
defendant's field preemption and conflict preemption 
arguments and concluded that the record up until that point 
"lack[ed] any evidence that the FDA set a ceiling on this 
matter."39 When the case proceeded to trial, the plaintiff 
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presented expert evidence in support of her assertion that the 
risk of either intra-arterial injection or perivascular 
extravasation is almost completely eliminated when the drug is 
administered by IV -drip rather than IV -push.40 She also 
submitted into evidence the correspondence between Wyeth 
and the FDA regarding possible changes to Phenergan's label. 
The five day trial ended with the judge giving two key 
instructions to the jury. The first was that although the jury 
could consider the evidence that Wyeth had compiled with the 
FDA requirements, it did not have to conclude that compliance 
necessarily meant that the warnings had been adequate. The 
second crucial instruction was that FDA regulations "permit a 
drug manufacturer to change a product label to add or 
strengthen a warning about its product without prior FDA 
approval so long as it later submits the revised warning for 
review and approval."41 The jury, in response to the questions 
on a special verdict form, found that Wyeth was liable for 
negligence, that Phenergan was a defective product since its 
warnings and instructions were inadequate, and that there was 
no intervening cause to disrupt the causal connection between 
the defendant's negligent actions and the plaintiffs injuries. 
The jury awarded the plaintiff a final damage award of 
$7,400,000 (which was reduced by the amount of the previous 
settlements with the physician's assistant and the health 
center). 
The defendant then filed a motion for judgment as a matter 
of law- which was based on preemption arguments. On 
August 3, 2004, the trial judge rejected the motion on three 
grounds. The first was that there was no direct conflict 
between FDA regulations and Levine's state-law claims. Not 
only did the FDA regulations permit strengthened warnings 
without its approval on an interim basis but Wyeth had been 
aware of at least 20 reported cases of gangrene amputations 
similar to Levine's since the 1960's. The second ground was 
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that Levine's state tort liability claim did not obstruct the 
FDA's work. In fact, the federal agency had not spent much 
time addressing the question of whether to warn against the I-V 
push administration of Phenergan. Finally, the court 
emphasized the compensatory function of the state law action 
that was absent from the federal regulation.42 
C. Supreme Court of Vermont 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Vermont, Wyeth 
claimed that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to 
consider the plaintiffs claims (since they conflicted with the 
defendant's obligations under federal law and were therefore 
preempted) and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the 
issue of damages. In a 4-1 decision, the appellate court 
affirmed the lower court decision in its entirety--rejecting the 
defendant's preemption arguments on the grounds that Wyeth 
could have changed the warning concerning the IV-push 
administration of Phenergan without prior FDA approval and 
that the "federal labeling requirements create a floor, not a 
ceiling, for state regulation."43 
In order to determine if the doctrine of preemption applied 
in this case, the majority relied on the following analytical 
model: 
Congress' intent may be explicitly stated in the 
statute's language or implicitly contained in its 
structure or purpose. In the absence of an 
express congressional command, state law is 
preempted if that law actually conflicts with 
federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly 
occupies a legislative field as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
room for the States to supplement it.44 
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It also noted that the presumption against preemption (absent a 
clear congressional intention to supersede state law, including 
state common law duties)45 has "added force" when there is a 
"long history of tort litigation" in the area of state common law 
at issue.46 Since Wyeth had conceded that Congress had not 
expressly preempted state tort actions through the FDCA and 
did not intend the FDCA to occupy the entire field of 
prescription drug regulation, the court only considered whether 
it was "impossible for the private party [Wyeth] to comply with 
both state and federal requirements" and whether Vermont's 
common-law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposed and objectives of Congress."4 7 
The court found no conflict, in general, between federal 
labeling requirements and state failure-to-warn claims based on 
the ability of the manufacturer, under the provisions of the 
CBE regulation, to add to and strengthen its already approved 
warnings.48 This finding was supported by the nearly 
unanimous conclusion by other courts that failure-to-warn 
claims are permissible in state courts.49 Wyeth 's attempt to 
draw a comparison to medical devise cases was unsuccessful 
since the FDCA's preemption clause only applied to medical 
devises and not to prescription drugs. 50 The majority also 
rejected the argument that it should follow the conflict 
preemption precedent established by U.S. Supreme Court in the 
case of Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. 51 In that instance 
the plaintiffs state tort claim was held to be in direct conflict 
with Department of Transportation's specific phase-in plan for 
safety devices and its intent to broaden the range of safety 
options available to consumers. The key difference between 
Geier and drug warning label cases was that "the FDA and the 
state share the purpose of encouraging pharmaceutical 
companies to alter their drug labels when they are inadequate 
to protect consumers."52 
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The court then considered whether the specific facts in the 
case before it justified a preemption of the state claims based 
on an impossibility of compliance claim. Wyeth had asserted 
that it could not comply with state law requirements since the 
FDA had approved the label in use at the time of Levine's 
injury. The court noted that the approval of the Phenergan 
warning label should not preclude a jury from finding that the 
label was insufficient since the company had the possibility, 
under the CBE regulation, to strengthen its warning with 
respect to the IV-push administration of Phenergan.53 It also 
rejected Wyeth 's suggestion that when the FDA approved the 
label in 1998, with the instruction to "[ re ]etain the same 
verbiage" (rather than with the changes suggested by Wyeth in 
1988), it was stating its opinion that the stronger warning was 
unnecessary. The problem with Wyeth's argument was that 
the label changes that it proposed in 1988 were no more 
adequate than the original label in warning against the IV -push 
administration of Phenergan. 54 
Wyeth was also unpersuasive in its claim that the Vermont 
common-law liability in this case would be an obstacle to the 
purposes and objectives of Congress. The court found that 
primary goal of the FDCA was to protect consumers from 
dangerous products55 and the purposes and objectives of 
Congress in the regulating the marketing of prescription drugs 
was merely to set the minimum standards under which a 
manufacturer must comply.56 The fact that the 1962 
amendments expressly limited the preemptive effect of the 
statute unless there is a "direct and positive conflict" between 
state and federal law enabled the court to conclude that "where 
it is possible to comply with both state law and the FDCA, the 
state law is consistent with the purposes and objectives of 
Congress."57 
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The discussion of the preemption issue concluded with an 
analysis of the preemption statement that the FDA had inserted 
into the preamble to the 2006 regulation. Although the court 
acknowledged that it is ordinarily required to defer to an 
agency's interpretation of the statute that it administers, it 
refused to do so in this case.58 Deference is appropriate when 
a statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue"- it is not appropriate when it contradicts the 
"unambiguously express intent of Congress."59 In this case, 
Congress had spoken on the issue. The FDCA provided for the 
express preemption of state laws (in drug regulation matters) 
only if it was impossible for a manufacturer to comply with 
both federal and state requirements. Since the CBE regulation 
already allowed a manufacturer to unilaterally add or 
strengthen a label warning, the issue of impossibility was not 
present. 
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Reiber argued that 
Levine 's common-law claims were in conflict with federal law 
for two reasons. The first was that it would be impossible for 
Wyeth to comply with both the state and federal requirements. 
The FDA had approved the administration of Phenergan by the 
IV method and it had required Wyeth to list the IV 
administration on its label. If Wyeth altered the label to 
comply with state law it would have to eliminate an FDA 
approved use from the label- and that would make it 
impossible for the company to comply with the state and 
federal laws. 60 The second was that allowing the plaintiffs 
state law claims to go forward would present an obstacle to 
federal purposes and objectives. While the goal of the FDA is 
to ensure that the drugs in the marketplace are safe, it does so 
knowing that no drug is without risks. When the FDA 
considers whether to approve a NDA, it engages in a risk-
benefit analysis with the intention of maximizing the 
availability of beneficial treatments. A state court jury, on the 
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other hand, "does not engage in a measured and multi-faceted 
policy analysis. Rather, a jury views the safety of the drug 
through the lens of a single patient who has already been 
catastrophically injured."61 The result is that a jury's verdict 
that a drug was unreasonably dangerous can fmstrate the 
FDA's wider public health assessment that the drug is safe and 
effective. 
IV. WYETH V. LEVINE- U.S. SUPREME COURT 
DECISION 
A. Majority Decision 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, with two 
concurrences and one dissent, affirmed the lower court 
decisions in favor of the plaintiff.62 The issue that Wyeth 
presented on appeal was "whether prescription drug labeling 
judgments imposed on manufacturers by the Food and Drug 
Administration ... pursuant to FDA' s comprehensive safety 
and efficacy authority under the Federal Food, Dmg, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 30 l et seq. , preempt state-law 
product liability claims premised on the theory that different 
labeling judgments were necessary to make drugs reasonably 
safe for use,"63 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the 
majority, addressed the somewhat different issue of whether 
the FDA's approval of Phencrgan provided Wyeth with a 
complete defense to Levine ' s common-law negligence and 
strict liability claims--and answered the question in the 
negative.64 
Before discussing the preemption issue, Stevens highlighted 
two important findings of fact that had been decided at the trial 
level and identified two legal principles that were essential to 
his analysis of the case. The first factual finding was that 
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Levine's arm would not have developed gangrene if the 
Phenergan label had adequately warned of the risks of 
administering the drug by the IV -push method. The fact that 
the physician assistant's administered a greater than 
recommended dose of the drug (which may have inadvertently 
entered an artery rather than a vein) was a foreseeable 
intervening force- and the inadequate label was both a but-for 
and a proximate cause of Levine's injuries.65 The second jury 
finding was that the lack of an adequate warning about the 
risks of an IV-push administration of Phenergan was the 
critical defect in its warning label.66 That the jury found the 
warning to be insufficient did not, however, mean that it had 
mandated a particular replacement label nor did it require the 
contraindicating of IV -push administration. 67 
Stevens then summarized the two legal cornerstones of 
preemption jurisdiction. The first was the principle that "the 
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every 
preemption case."68 The second was that in those preemption 
cases in which Congress has legislated in a field traditionally 
occupied by the States, the court "starts with the assumption 
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress."69 
Wyeth had argued that Levine's state tort actions were 
preempted because of the impossibility of complying with a 
state-law duty to modify the drug's label without violating 
federal law and because a state tort action created an 
unacceptable "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress"70 since it allowed 
a jury's decision about a drug label to trump the expert 
judgment of the FDA. Stevens found both arguments to be 
without merit. 
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1. Impossible to Comply 
Wyeth 's impossible to comply argument was based on the 
premise that, once the FDA has approved a drug warning label, 
the manufacturer could not change the wording of the label 
until a supplemental application was filed with, and approved 
by, the FDA. Wyeth argued that it could not have relied on the 
CBE regulation to unilaterally change the warning label for 
Phenergin since the CBE regulation had been amended so that 
it only applied to cases in which the labels would "reflect 
newly acquired information."71 Since Levine presented no new 
evidence (which the FDA had not already considered) 
concerning the risks of the IV -push administration, Wyeth 
claimed that it would have been impossible to change the label 
to meet state-law obligations without violating federal law. 
Stevens dismissed Wyeth 's argument as a 
"misapprehens[ion] both of the federal drug regulatory scheme 
and its burden in establishing a pre-emption defense."72 He 
found no need to consider the merits of Wyeth's contention 
that the 2008 amendment of the CBE regulation was consistent 
with the FDC and the regulation in effect at the time of 
Levine ' s injection since the "newly acquired information" that 
is referred to in the regulation applies to "new analyses of 
previously submitted data" and not just to new data.73 
According to the amended CBE regulation: 
[I]f the sponsor submits adverse event 
information to FDA, and then later conducts a 
new analysis of data showing risks of a different 
type or of greater severity or frequency than did 
reports previously submitted to FDA, the 
sponsor meets the requirements for newly 
. d. c . 74 acqwre In1ormat10n. 
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The majority opinion acknowledged that the trial record was 
"limited concerning what newly acquired information Wyeth 
had or should have had about the risks of IV -push 
administration of Phenergan."75 There was, however, evidence 
of at least 20 instances in which a Phenergan injection had 
resulted in gangrene and amputations. Wyeth had notified the 
FDA after the first case came to its attention in 1967- and had 
worked with the FDA to change the label. The court suggested 
that after it became aware of the additional amputations, Wyeth 
could have analyzed the accumulating data and added a 
stronger label warning about the IV -push method of 
administration. 
Stevens presented also two reasons for rejecting Wyeth's 
assertion that its unilateral change to the warning label would 
have constituted an unauthorized distribution and misbranding 
of the drug. The first was that Wyeth was incorrect when it 
assumed that a drug would be considered a new drug (without 
an effective application) if a change had. been made to its label. 
Under the FDCA, the unilateral strengthening of an already 
approved warning label would not, in fact, change the drug into 
a new drug.76 The second problem was Wyeth's failure to 
understand that the mislabeling provision of the FDCA did not 
focus on the alteration of an FDA approved label but rather on 
the substance of the label-including its failure to include 
"adequate warnings."77 Whether a drug has been misbranded 
is a matter for a federal jury to ultimately decide.78 And, 
neither Wyeth nor the government, in its amicus curiae brief, 
was able to identify even one instance in which the FDA had 
initiated an enforcement action against a manufacturer for 
strengthening a warning label as provided for under the CBE 
regulation. 
The Supreme Court credits "Wyeth's cramped reading of 
the CBE regulation and its broad reading of the FDCA 
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misbranding and unauthorized distribution provisions"79 to the 
company's suggestion that the FDA, and not the manufacturer, 
has the primary responsibility for the content of a drug label. 
Such a suggestion is in opposition to the central premise of 
federal drug regulation. Both the amendments to the FDCA 
and FDA regulations designate the manufacturer as the party 
responsible for "crafting an adequate label and [for] ensuring 
that its warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on the 
market."80 The passage of the FDAAA, in 2007, may have 
authorized the FDA, under some circumstance, to order 
manufacturers to revise their labels but it also reaffirmed the 
manufacturer's obligations-including those specifically 
referred to in the CBE regulation.81 Consequently, Wyeth had 
an obligation to change its warning label to adequately describe 
the risk of gangrene from IV-push injections of Phenergan-
and was permitted to do so, under the CBE regulation, even 
before it received FDA approvai.82 
While it is true that the FDA may ultimately reject unilateral 
labeling changes made pursuant to the CBE regulation, there 
was no evidence that it would have done so for changes in the 
Phenergan label. Wyeth did not allege that it was prohibited by 
the FDA from trying to give the kind of warning that the 
Vermont jury sought. The Vermont Superior Court found, as a 
matter of fact, that there was "no evidence in the record that 
either the FDA or the manufacturer gave more than passing 
attention to the issue of' the IV -push versus IV -drip 
administration of Phenergan.83 The Vermont Supreme Court 
also concluded that there was no record of the FDA's intention 
to either preserve the IV -push method or to prohibit the 
manufacturer from strengthening the warning with regard to 
the TV-push method. 84 Finally, Wyeth itself never alleged that 
it had supplied the FDA with an evaluation or analysis of the 
specific dangers associated with the IV -push method. 
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Wyeth's claim 
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that it would have been impossible to comply with the state and 
federal requirements since there is no evidence that the FDA 
would have prevented it from adding a stronger warning to the 
Phenergan label. 
2. Obstruction of Purposes and Objectives of Regulation of 
Congress 
Wyeth's second preemption argument was based on the 
theory that if it complied with the state-law duty (to provide a 
stronger warning on the Phenergan label), it would, in fact, 
obstruct the purposes and objectives of the federal regulatory 
scheme (including the need for FDA officials to use their 
expert knowledge to strike a balance between competing 
objectives of safety and efficiency).85 Stevens rejected this 
claim on the grounds that it was faulty in its interpretation of 
congressional intent and represented an overboard view of the 
agency's power to preempt state law. 
Congress enacted the Food and Drug Act and the FDCA to 
supplement, but not replace, the protections already available 
to consumers under state laws.8() Neither the acts nor their 
subsequent amendments provided any federal remedies to 
injured consumers. Stevens suggested two reasons for this 
omission. The first was that widely available state remedies 
already provided appropriate relief. The second was that the 
possibility of costly state remedies promoted consumer 
protection by motivating manufacturers to be more vigilant in 
producing safe products with adequate warning labels.87 
Another significant matter contributing to the majority's 
decision was the fact that Congress had never amended the 
FDCA to expressly preempt state law suits involving 
prescription drugs. Congress could have drafted a general 
preemption clause for the FDCA when it included the specific 
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preemption provision in the Medical Devices Amendments in 
1976. The fact that it was silent on the issue at a point in time 
(when it was certainly aware of the prevalence of state court 
litigation) convinced Stevens that Congress "did not intend the 
FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug 
safety and effectiveness. "88 
Wyeth had suggested that one of the ways that state lawsuits 
obstructed the purposes and objections of the federal regulation 
of drugs was that they did not take into account the balancing 
of risks and benefits that inform the FDA in its decision 
making process. The FDA itself had stated in the preamble to 
the 2006 regulation that the FDCA established "both a floor 
and a ceiling" for the regulation of drugs. 89 It then proceeded 
to articulate its conclusion that state laws and state law actions, 
including failure-to-warn claims, were an obstacle to 
achievement of the full objectives and purposes of the federal 
regulatory law since they "threaten FDA's statutorily 
prescribed role as the expert Federal agency responsible for 
evaluating and regulating drugs."90 
Stevens found Wyeth's reliance on the FDA' s preamble to 
the 2006 regulation to be less than convincing. While it is true 
that a federal regulation may preempt conflicting state laws,91 
preemption is not guaranteed if the agency acts without 
congressional authorization. An agency's mere assertion that 
state law has been preempted because it is an obstacle to 
statutory objectives cannot survive a judicial determination to 
the contrary. One of the problems with the FDA's preamble 
statement was that it directly contradicted the FDA's notice of 
proposed rulemaking for the 2006 regulation. That notice 
specifically stated that the rule "would not contain policies that 
have federalism implications or preempt State Law. "92 
Consequently, when the FDA finalized the rule with its new 
articulation of the FDCA's preemptive effect in the preamble, 
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it did so without giving the states or other interested parties 
notice of the proposed change or opportunity to comment it. 93 
The preamble was also suspect since it reversed two of the 
FDA's longstanding positions (that the federal labeling 
standards were a floor upon which the states could build and 
that the FDA would not attempt to preempt failure-to-warn 
claims) without providing a reasoned explanation for the 
change.94 Prior to 2006, both Congress and the FDA have 
treated state law as a complementary form of drug regulation 
and had traditionally relied on state tort suits to "uncover 
unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug 
manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly."95 
The court also rejected Wyeth's claim that the alleged 
conflict between federal and state law in the present case was 
analogous to the one that supported the car manufacturer' s 
preemption claim in the Geier v. American Honda Motor, 
Co .. 96 In that case, the Department of Transportation had 
formulated the regulatory scheme (which allowed car 
manufacturers to satisfy a safety requirement by choosing from 
a range of passive restraint devices) after it had conducted a 
formal rulemaking and then adopted a phase-in plan. Unlike 
the FDA's nonexistent record to explain the basis for the 
changes announced in the 2006 preamble, the Department of 
Transportation's contemporaneous record "revealed the factors 
the agency had weighed and the balance it had struck."97 
For all of the above reasons, Stevens concluded that 
preamble of the 2006 regulation did not merit deference, that it 
was possible for Wyeth to comply with the state and federal 
laws, and that Wyeth's obstruction of purposes and objectives 
claims were insufficient to preempt Levine's common law 
claims. 
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B. Concurring Opinions 
I. Justice Breyer 
The Justice Stephen Breyer's concurring opinion was very 
brief. His primary concern was to emphasize that the reason 
the majority arrived at its opinion was because there was "no 
occasion in this case to consider the preemptive effect of a 
specific agency regulation bearing the force of law."98 As 
such, this decision would not preclude the court from deciding 
in the future that FDA had sought to determine whether and 
when state law acts had become a hindrance to achieving the 
congressional goal of safe drug-related medical care and had 
embodied those determinations in lawful regulations that had a 
preemptive effect. 
2. Justice Thomas 
Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion that concurred in 
the judgment but did not join the majority's implicit 
endorsement of a far-reaching implied preemption doctrine that 
"routinely invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts 
with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or 
generalized notions of congressional that are 
embodied within the text of federal law."9 His approach was 
based on his more traditionally conservative view of the 
"delicate balance of power mandated by the Constitution."100 
The recurring theme in Thomas' concurring opinion was his 
conviction that the question of preemption had to turn on 
whether state law conflicted with the text of the relevant 
federal statute or with the federal regulations authorized by that 
text. Since the texts of the statutory and regulatory scheme did 
not guarantee that a company was insulated from liability 
under state law once it received an FDA-approval for a 
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particular drug label, there was no "direct conflict" between the 
federal law and state law and a judgment based on the state law 
could not be preempted. 101 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Samuel Alito characterized 
the Wyeth case as an illustration of the proposition "that tragic 
facts make bad law."102 Alito found it incomprehensible that 
the majority would allow a state tort jury, rather than the FDA, 
to have the ultimate responsibility for regulating the warning 
labels for prescription dmgs. Such a result was possible only 
because the Court had ignored its own precedent in the case of 
Geier103 and had disregarded the general principles of conflict 
preemption. 
The minority was convinced that the proper framing of the 
issue in this case should have been "whether a state tort jury 
can countermand the FDA's considered judgment that 
Phenergan's FDA-mandated warning renders its intravenous 
(IV) use "safe."104 Alito emphasized the importance of a 
drug's warning label. Not only is it "the standard under which 
the FDA determines whether a product is safe and effective,"105 
it is also the "centerpiece of risk management" . . . "as it 
communicates to health care practitioners the agency's formal, 
authoritative conclusions regarding the conditions under which 
the product can be used safely and effectively." 106 When the 
FDA follows its statutory mandate and determines that a drug 
is on the balance "safe," its judgment should not be 
countermanded by a conflicting determination under state 
common-law. The conflict itself is the basis for federal 
preemption- even in those instances where Congress has not 
d . 107 enacte an express preemptiOn. 
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Alito then went on to demonstrate how the court, in Geier, 
was able to apply the conflict preemption doctrine to a situation 
where the regulatory statute contained a savings clause. 108 A 
key factor in that case was the view of the Secretary that the 
Department of Transportation's decision to allow the auto 
makers to choose from a number of safety options was the best 
way to promote safety. "Because the Secretary determined that 
the menu of alternative technologies was "safe," the doctrine of 
conflict preemption barred [the plaintiffs] efforts to deem 
some of those federally approved alternatives "unsafe" under 
state tort law." 109 The minority thought the court should have 
applied its rationale in Geier to the present case--in which the 
FDA had deemed the methods of alternative administration 
provided in the menu on the Phenergan label to be "safe" and 
"effective. " 
The remainder of the dissenting opinion was devoted to a 
discussion of the three categories of reasons why the majority 
of the court failed follow its own precedent in Geier. The first 
was factual. The minority suggested that the court had 
willfully disregarded the fact that the FDA had considered (and 
stmck a balance between) the costs and benefits attached to the 
IV push method. 110 The second was legal. The court had 
denied the existence of a federal-state conflict in this case; 111 it 
dismissed the FDA's articulation of its preemptive intent in the 
preamble to the 2006 regulation on the grounds that the 
interested Rarties were not afforded notice or an opportunity for 
comment; 12 it determined that the FDA's preamble, unlike the 
Department of Transportation's regulation, did not "bear the 
force of law;" 113 it "sandwiched" its discussion of Geier 
between its discussion of the "presumption against 
preemption" and its lengthy consideration of the traditional 
coexistence of state and federal law in the area of dmg 
regulation; 11 4 and it appeared to completely disregard the 
FDA's explanation, in its amicus brief, with regard to the 
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conflict between state tort cases and the federal labeling 
regime. 115 And, the third reason was judgmental. The court 
had decided to recklessly allow ill-equipped juries to perform 
the FDA's cost-benefit balancing functions. 116 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine was 
certainly disappointing to many in the business community. 
This was particularly true for companies producing 
commodities that are regulated by the federal government. If 
the court had preempted the state product liability actions 
against drug companies, there was hope that it would 
eventually extend that same preemption protection to product 
liability cases involving manufacturers of products as diverse 
as antifreeze, fireworks, popcorn, cigarettes, and light bulbs. 117 
It would also have allowed companies to concentrate on 
complying with only one set of regulatory laws. 
In recent years, business has found many sympathetic allies 
in Washington, D.C. The Bush administration "encouraged 
federal agencies to issue rules preempting state laws and 
declared that a single federal standard held sway." 11 8 The court 
used theories of express and implied preemption to limit the 
ability of injured parties to sue manufacturers in state court. 
There has, however, been some shifting of sympathies under 
the Obama administration. On January 20, 2009, a 
memorandum was sent to federal agency heads instructing 
them to stay pending or recently completed rules. On March 4, 
2009, the Supreme Court rejected the preemption arguments of 
Wyeth (and the Bush administration ' s amicus brief in support 
of Wyeth). A week later, the Office of Budget and 
Management issued a statement that it had taken note of the 
principles in Wyeth and intended to provide adequate notice 
and comment periods for federal regulations and to instruct 
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federal agencies to preempt state tort laws only when Congress 
intends it to do so. 119 Finally, on May 20, 2009, President 
Obama issued a revised Executive Order 13132 instructing 
federal agency heads to roll-back the prior administration's 
attempts to issue regulations that were designed to protect 
compames from state court lawsuits and that were not 
justified.120 
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